Dutch Police Seize a VPN Server: What It Means for Online Privacy

Windscribe client

In early February 2026, Windscribe reported that Dutch authorities had physically seized one of its VPN servers located in the Netherlands — and the company claims it happened without a warrant. According to Windscribe’s posts on social media, officials showed up at a data-center, removed a server from a rack, and informed the provider they would return it after a “full analysis” — all without presenting formal legal paperwork on site.

Windscribe has been careful to reassure users that the seized machine likely contains no useful data because it runs entirely on RAM-only servers, meaning all operational data is stored in volatile memory and erased when power is cut. In such setups, boots leave behind only a stock operating system image, with no persistent logs or user-identifying data.

Was This Legal?

Whether Dutch police can legally seize a server without a traditional “warrant” depends on local law and the procedural context.

In the Netherlands, law enforcement generally needs judicial authorization to seize digital evidence or access communications systems. Under Dutch criminal procedure law (e.g., Wetboek van Strafvordering), authorities typically require a warrant to exercise investigative powers against information systems or obtain data carriers — and this extends to servers in data centers.

However, there are exceptions in many legal systems (including Dutch law) for exigent circumstances — situations where authorities believe delaying action to obtain a warrant could result in evidence being destroyed or public safety being at risk. At this stage, Windscribe’s claim that no warrant was presented has not been independently confirmed by Dutch law enforcement, and authorities have not publicly commented on the legal basis for the action.

So the bottom line for readers: it’s unusual and concerning for a server seizure to happen without clear judicial oversight in a jurisdiction like the Netherlands, but until official legal filings are seen, we can’t definitively say whether police broke procedure or simply used a legal mechanism that wasn’t shared publicly.

How Common Are VPN Server Seizures?

Events like this are rare but not unprecedented:

  • In 2016, Dutch police seized two servers belonging to another VPN provider, Perfect Privacy, at a hosting facility, again without direct contact from the provider at first. That company asserted its no-logs stance and reported no user data was compromised.
  • A well-known example outside the Netherlands was the 2023 Swedish police raid on Mullvad, where officers executed a search warrant seeking customer data – and left empty-handed because no logs existed.
  • In 2021, Windscribe itself disclosed that servers in Ukraine had been seized, revealing private keys that were not fully secured, prompting a wider industry shift toward stronger server security practices.

Worldwide, authorities do regularly make legal requests for VPN logs — often through mutual legal assistance treaties — but physically seizing infrastructure is far less common because most reputable VPN providers operate with strict no-logs policies and ephemeral hardware precisely to limit what can be taken.

Implications for VPN Users and Anonymity

This incident highlights a few key takeaways for anyone depending on a VPN for privacy:

1. No-logs policies matter — but verify them.

Providers that undergo independent audits and have transparent records of law-enforcement interactions give users more confidence that they’re not secretly storing user data.

2. Technical design can limit what’s accessible.

RAM-only server architectures drastically reduce what can be recovered from seized hardware — but they are not perfect. If a server is seized while still powered on, there’s a narrow window for forensic extraction from volatile memory.

3. No VPN can guarantee complete anonymity.

Even with strong no-logs architecture, an attacker with access to network traffic, DNS queries, or metadata outside the VPN’s infrastructure can potentially infer user information. A VPN is a strong privacy tool — but it’s one layer among many in a broader privacy strategy.

4. Jurisdiction and legal context matter.

The Netherlands is an EU member with robust data protection law — so if the claim of warrantless seizure proves accurate, it raises real questions about how privacy infrastructure can be targeted under investigative law in Europe. European law generally requires judicial oversight, and VPN providers hosting servers there may soon face increased scrutiny.